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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the existing policy frameworks for mitigation of diffuse water pollution from 
agriculture (DWPA) in England and China. With reference to a conceptual model of the process of 
policy transfer or international lesson drawing, and possible constraints to this, it assesses whether 
and how China can draw lessons to improve current policy from the supra-national and national 
provisions of the EU and a member state that by 2016 had comprehensively implemented EU 
agricultural and environmental policy. DWPA is first analysed as a public policy challenge to inform 
specification of a generic framework for its mitigation. The current policy frameworks for mitigation 
of DWPA in England and China are evaluated, and their potential for improvement is assessed. A 
number of barriers to lesson drawing for regulation, incentive payments schemes and advice 
provision are diagnosed. These barriers are potentially least in relation to advice provision and its 
use to promote voluntary action by farmers. Given its structure and capabilities the public 
agricultural extension system in China is also recognised as a key resource. A focus on three 
policy approaches to mitigate DWPA in China is recommended: i) targeted regulation to a 
‘reference level’ of large intensive livestock, and ultimately other large commercial farms; ii) 
strategic use of incentive payment schemes to protect water resources from DWPA; and iii) re-
orientation of the ethos and modalities of operation of the extension system, informed by 
international lesson drawing, with the aim of rebalancing farm productivity and environmental 
protection. 
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1. Introduction 
Water pollution from agriculture and its consequences are a source of increasing concern 
(Vorosmarty et al., 2010). In England the leading pollutants from agriculture and wastewater are 
sediment, chemicals, nitrate and phosphorus (Gov.UK, 2016a). Projected improvement in 
compliance with European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD; CED, 2000) standards 
for ‘good status’ seem modest in rising from only 17% of all waterbodies in 2015 to 25% in 2021, 
but physical modifications of waterbodies are a common reason for ‘failure’. In contrast, 82-88% of 
the chemical and biological parameters monitored should be at ‘good status’ or better in all areas 
by 2021 (Gov.UK, 2016a). In China water pollution remains severe with more than 61% of 
groundwater and 28% of surface waters in the main river basins classified as unfit for human use 
or contact (China Water Risk, 2015). Agriculture is a major cause, estimated to be the source for 
57% of the nitrogen and 69% of the phosphorus entering Chinese watercourses (MEP, 2010). 
Point source  water pollution can be mitigated by pre-discharge treatment of wastewater subject to 1
the right regulation, technology, and political will (Smith et al., 2015a). When control has been at 
least partially achieved policy emphasis shifts to diffuse pollution for which agriculture is a 
significant source. However, diffuse water pollution is more difficult to mitigate as it consists of the 
releases of diverse pollutants from dispersed sources across the landscape including run off and 
leaching from fields and farmyards.  
The challenges and conditions for agriculture and water resource management in China are 
unique and there is no ‘model country’ to provide a reference point for policy solutions; however, 
large federal countries such as the United States and Australia, and supra-national bodies such as 
the European Union can provide applicable lessons (World Bank, 2006), subject to analysis of how 
these might transfer with appropriate modification. Such detailed analysis is lacking in relation to 
DWPA. In 2016, England (as part of the UK) is representative of an EU member state that has 
comprehensively implemented EU agricultural and environmental policy . This paper evaluates the 2
policy framework for mitigation of DWPA in such an EU member state in comparison to that in 
China; providing an original assessment of the potential for international lesson drawing .  3
The assessment proceeds by first adopting a conceptual model for the process of lesson drawing 
and identification of constraints to this. It then analyses the policy challenge of DWPA to derive a 
generic framework for its mitigation. The characterisation and validity of this framework is further 
established by evaluation of policy in England (supported by other OECD country examples) and 
equivalent policy in China. The conceptual model for policy transfer is then applied to review the 
potential for an improved policy framework in China and conclusions are drawn. 
2. Methods and materials   
Preparation of this paper employed review and analysis of literature and secondary data. This was 
supplemented by semi-structured interviews with key informants in England and China, field visits 
to four farming systems in China, and workshops with stakeholders in each of those locations, and 
with national stakeholders in Beijing. The local workshops were attended by community leaders, 
farmers, large farm managers, local researchers and government officers, including 
 A discrete and discernible source of wastewater such as pipes, ditches and channels.1
 Noting that the UK referendum result of 23rd June 2016 prompts UK withdrawal from the EU. This paper 2
focuses on England rather than the UK because of differences in policy in Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland. 
 The bilateral research and knowledge exchange for this paper can be seen as a part of the ‘soft’ policy 3
transfer (see definition below) conducted by the Sustainable Agricultural Innovation Network (SAIN, 2016) 
and inspired by common challenges, needs and aspirations for sustainable agriculture in the UK and China.
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representatives of the public agricultural extension service (PAES) at administrative levels from 
village to county and city. The workshops were part of a wider project investigating nutrient 
management in Chinese agriculture and associated risks of DWPA. The farming systems visited in 
China were: rice-wheat farms near Lake Tai in Jiangsu Province; maize-wheat farms in Huantai 
County, Shandong Province; solar greenhouses for horticultural crops near Yangling, Shaanxi 
Province; and kiwi fruit and maize growers in Zhouzhi, Shaanxi Province. 
3. A conceptual model for lesson drawing  
The concept of lesson drawing or policy transfer is a domain of public policy analysis (e.g. Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 1996, 2000; Evans 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011). It can be understood as the 
process through which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in one 
jurisdiction can be used in the development of similar features in another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2000). As in Figure 1 and Table 1, the process of lesson drawing can be analysed in stages 
(Benson, 2009; Rose, 2005). Figure 1 infers possible constraints to the transferability of lessons, 
which are identified and posed as questions and indicators in Table 1. Many of the constraints are 
associated with ‘hard’ policy transfer, i.e. adoption by the public sector based on formalised peer-
to-peer information exchange (Benson, 2009). This contrasts to ‘soft’ transfers occurring flexibly via 
exchange of norms, knowledge and techniques by a diverse range of actors and processes. The 
latter may be less constrained but typically more concerned with how best to implement a given 
policy or programme than its functional objective (Benson, 2009).  
position - Figure 1: Stages of lesson drawing. 
Source: Benson, 2009. 
position - Table 1: Constraints to lesson drawing  
Source: adapted from Benson 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000. 
4. The policy challenge of diffuse water pollution from agriculture  
As a ‘market-failure’ displaying public good and externality properties DWPA is challenging for 
public policy (Weersink and Livernois, 1996; Smith and Porter, 2010; OECD, 2012). Bio-physical 
uncertainties and the temporal and spatial characteristics of DWPA render a solely regulatory 
approach costly if not impractical (OECD, 2012; Smith et al., 2015a). Complexity is exacerbated by 
the multi-functionality of land use, its delivery of both complementary and competing ecosystem 
services, and the relevant property rights of society and land owners. This applies to the activity 
that generates DWPA but also to some of its mitigation measures. For example, riparian buffer 
zones can limit pollutant runoff but also provide amenity, habitat and carbon sequestration. 
Furthermore, today’s pollution is in large part a legacy of past farming practice, and change in 
practice today may not fully deliver its benefits for decades to come (Powers, et al., 2016). 
Consequently how all costs and benefits from agriculture and DWPA mitigation are distributed is a 
matter for socio-political determination. Deliberation on this is best decentralised to the level 
appropriate to account for existing relevant responsibilities and local specificities (Smith et al., 
2015a). 
5. A mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture  
5.1 A common framework 
Given the characteristics of DWPA (Section 4) a range of policies for its mitigation must be 
considered. Regulation of farming practice can be complemented by economic incentives, 
provision of advice to promote voluntary action and self-regulation, and at the margin acquisition of 
land or control of its use (Weersink and Livernois, 1996; Shortle and Horan, 2001; Mauerhofer et 
al. 2013). An appropriately sequenced policy mix is likely to outperform a single instrument such as 
a pollution tax, especially where multiple barriers to farmer adoption of DWPA mitigation measures 
exist (OECD, 2012). Such barriers exist in China as identified by Smith and Siciliano, 2015. There 
needs to be emphasis on changing the behaviour of not only farmers but also all other 
stakeholders. A national approach is needed that addresses all polluters without singling out farmers. 
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Government agencies, civil society organisations and private businesses must all take actions at 
scales from sub-catchments to national and transboundary (OECD, 2012). A well designed policy 
mix for mitigation of DWPA will facilitate coordination of actions. It must also be supported by 
adequate scientific understanding and evidence. We term this mixed approach, including the 
knowledge base that supports it, the ‘mitigation framework for DWPA’ (Smith and Siciliano, 2015).  
position - Figure 2: A mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture  
Source: Baldock, n.d. 
Figure 2 depicts a layered approach of complementary policies. This corresponds to current 
provision in England as considered in Section 6, whilst other EU and OECD countries including 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada also employ a regulatory approach complemented by advice, 
voluntary action and targeted incentives (OECD, 2010). First, enforceable regulations applied 
widely aim to achieve a baseline of environmental protection. This equates to the ‘reference 
level’ (Scheele, 1999) that divides environmental standards that farmers are expected to meet at 
their own cost from higher standards for which society is willing to provide remuneration (or at least 
compensation for income foregone). Meeting standards at the ‘reference level’ should become a 
‘compliance condition’ to receive such remuneration (Weersink and Livernois, 1996). In 
increasingly targeted layers, regulations to protect water resources can then be complemented by 
voluntary action and incentives. Provision of advice is ‘cross-cutting’ as it can facilitate compliance 
with regulation and adoption of voluntary and incentivised measures. The national knowledge base 
is similarly an essential supporting resource, providing policy makers and farm advisors with 
information on the outcomes of DWPA mitigation measures, costs and farmer responses. 
5.2 Other policies 
5.2.1 Water quality trading 
The mitigation framework in Figure 2 is not exclusive of other policy options. For example, water 
quality trading (WQT) schemes as a form of emissions trading (OECD, 2012) could be an 
alternative or complement to incentive payments. ‘Cap and trade’ schemes have the potential to 
limit emissions at lowest net cost to society (Choi, 2006) but are institutionally demanding for 
mitigation of DWPA as they require: binding regulatory limits on pollution levels; sufficient variation 
in pollution control costs between farms to make gains from trading possible net of transactions 
costs; trading rules that are simple and minimise transaction costs; and a trusted intermediary to 
facilitate trading (adapted from OECD, 2012). They also require the measurement of emissions, 
inputs or change in environmental conditions (Choi, 2006). Consequently, almost all WQT 
schemes are only partially capped  (OECD, 2012). A typical scenario is that point source polluters 4
buy pollution reductions to achieve their regulatory compliance in the form of input use reductions 
made voluntarily by farms. DWPA can thus be profitably reduced by the farmer but is not capped. 
Water quality may also benefit from schemes such as ‘wetland banking’. In the USA under the 
Clean Water Act (Section 4.4) conversion of wetlands to other uses is capped to “no net loss” so 
that any loss must be compensated by provision of new wetlands or enhancement of existing sites. 
‘Wetlands banks’ can create wetlands in multiple locations and sell ‘wetland credits’ to property 
developers to offset wetland loss (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010). 
5.2.2 Pollution taxes 
A tax on emissions would best apply the polluter-pays principle to change behaviour, but given the 
costs of monitoring DWPA the ‘second-best’ policy of a tax on the inputs that cause emissions is 
usually a default (Lally et al, 2007). Examples include pesticide taxes in Denmark, France, Italy, 
Norway and Sweden and fertiliser taxes in Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden and USA (OECD, 
2012). Inelastic demand for farm inputs, swapping of pollutants or pollution pathways as farming 
 Input (nitrogen) trading within a cap between farmers in the Lake Taupo catchment, New Zealand provides an 4
exception (OECD, 2012).
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systems change, international trade competitiveness, equity for farmers already compliant with 
regulated input use levels and political resistance from farmers are all issues that may limit 
application of this policy. However, there is evidence that sufficiently high tax levels supported by 
farm advice can achieve reductions in input use without loss of farm production (OECD, 2012). 
5.2.3 Reduction of perverse incentives from agricultural support policies 
An alternative approach to mitigation of DWPA is to remove or reduce the effect of policies that 
raise producer prices, subsidise use of polluting inputs or by other means encourage intensive 
farming. Such policies neglect variation in landscapes and may drive intensification poorly matched 
to environmental capacity to mitigate and absorb pollution (OECD, 2012). 
6. The mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture in England 
6.1 Regulation 
In England relevant regulation relates mainly to the use (storage, handling and application) of 
agricultural inputs (pesticides, inorganic fertilisers and manures) with the potential for negative 
environmental impacts. Regulations are numerous and detailed. The EU Nitrates Directive (CEC, 
1991) as transposed into national legislation can be cited as a leading example. Areas where 
nitrate levels in water exceed, or are at risk of exceeding 50 mg per litre, and/or are eutrophic, are 
designated as Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) within which farmers are required to implement 
measures designed to reduce and/or prevent nitrate loss to water through leaching or run-off. Farm 
inspections are carried out to ensure compliance with standards that include nitrate application 
levels, timing of applications and adequacy of fertiliser storage.  
6.2 Voluntary action 
Some measures to mitigate DWPA may be adopted by farmers out of altruistic concern for 
environmental quality, but for most adoption is motivated by cost or time savings from improved 
practice. In England government agencies have advised farmers and partnered industry-led 
voluntary initiatives  to implement environmental protection measures. Voluntary action by farmers 5
is also motivated by the advice and technical assistance provided by non-government 
organisations (NGOs). Foremost in this are registered charities, including rivers trusts, wildlife 
trusts and other farm advisory groups , that source funding from governmental (UK and EU) and 6
private sources. They generally seek to develop and encourage farmer adoption of ‘win-win’ 
solutions of management improvements, cost savings and environmental protection. Examples of 
measures include fencing of streams, clean and dirty water separation in farmyards, and re-
location of feeders, tracks and gateways. Many farmers/farm managers are also highly trained and 
experienced, particularly for larger commercial operations, and seen as part of agricultural 
knowledge and information systems (AKIS ) are capable of innovating cost saving and 7
environmentally beneficial practices.  
6.3 Incentive payments 
Incentive payments can take a variety of forms, but in general provide incentive (or compensation) 
for change in farm input use, management practice or land use that mitigates DWPA. Farmers in 
England can participate in a variety of schemes. Most participate in the Basic Payments Scheme 
(BPS) funded under the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This provides an annual per 
 Three leading examples are: the Campaign for the Farmed Environment (CFE), the Voluntary Initiative (VI), 5
and the Tried & Tested initiative.
 For example, LEAF (Linking Environment and Farming).  6
 Defined as the organizations, institutions and actors that generate and exchange information to enhance 7
farmer knowledge and skills, with the aim of enabling them to co-produce new knowledge and solutions (EU 
SCAR, 2012).
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hectare (ha) subsidy aimed to support farm incomes and maintain agricultural productivity. To 
receive the payment farmers must comply with ‘Statutory Management Requirements’ (SMRs) and 
‘Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions’ (GAECs) that relate to public, animal and plant 
health, environment, climate change, good agricultural condition of land and animal welfare (Defra, 
2016). Known as cross-compliance, this includes a set of basic measures to protect watercourses 
and groundwater against pollution, soil erosion and over abstraction . Farmers have incentive to 8
adopt these measures as failure to do so can result in loss of some or all of the BPS payment 
(though this is subject to the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement).  
Many farmers can also access payments under the rural development policy of the CAP. In 
England payments are offered by the Countryside Stewardship (CS) scheme . This incentivizes 9
farmers to adopt measures and provide environmental goods beyond those required by the cross-
compliance and greening rules8. Unlike its predecessor schemes9 most options in the CS scheme 
are competitive. Targeting and scoring of applications from farmers aims to encourage applications 
well-matched to local environmental priorities  (NE, 2015). The overarching scheme priority “is to 10
protect and enhance the natural environment, in particular the diversity of wildlife (biodiversity) and 
water quality” (NE, 2015, pp. 3). Provision is made for: ‘Mid-Tier’ multi-year agreements for widely 
applicable environmental improvements including management options and capital grants; ‘Higher 
Tier’ more targeted multi-year agreements for environmentally significant sites, commons and 
woodlands requiring complex management; and ‘Capital Grants’ for hedgerows and boundaries, 
improving water quality, developing implementation plans, feasibility studies, and woodland 
creation and improvement (NE, 2015). The ‘Mid-Tier’ includes the specific aim to reduce DWPA 
and applicants can select from a number of relevant management options, plus items eligible for 
capital grants .  11
Aside from publicly funded schemes, UK policy makers have encouraged  the private sector to 12
invest in water resource protection through payments for ecosystem services (PES) . The leading 13
examples to date are investment by water companies in farm management measures that 
enhance water retention in uplands and protection of water quality in drinking water source 
areas . Investments are motivated by ability to demonstrate value for water customers and 14
shareholders. Such initiatives were only recently facilitated by reforms by the water industry 
regulator that permit water company investments on land owned by private landowners and 
investment appraisal over a sufficiently long time horizon to capture benefits (compared for 
 Since 2015, farmers with land above set thresholds also have to meet ‘greening’ rules to receive a 8
‘greening payment’ making up about 30% of their total BPS payment. Requirements for this make little direct 
provision for water resource protection, although riparian buffer strips can qualify under a requirement for 
ecological focus areas (EFAs); e.g. buffer strips, catch crops, cover crops, fallow land, hedges and nitrogen-
fixing crops (RPA, 2016).
 This superceded three previous schemes from January 2016: the Environmental Stewardship scheme; the 9
English Woodland Grant Scheme; and capital grants from the Catchment Sensitive Farming (CSF) 
programme. CSF is a project run by Natural England in partnership with the Environment Agency and the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. It raises awareness of DWPA by giving free training 
and advice to farmers in selected priority catchments in England. Grants were also provided for a variety of 
works including infrastructure for clean and dirty water separation, track maintenance, watercourse fencing, 
roofing of manure storage and resurfacing of gateways.
 As set out in regional statements of priorities (Gov.UK, 2016b).10
 ‘Water quality grants’ are only available in priority catchments identified in the CSFprogramme.11
 Publication of Smith et al., 2013, provides an example.12
 Wunder (2008, pp. 835) defines PES as “(a) a voluntary transaction where (b) a well-defined 13
environmental service (ES) or a land use likely to secure that service (c) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum 
one) service buyer (d) from a (minimum one) service provider (e) if and only if the service provider secures 
service provision (conditionality)”.  
 E.g. Upstream Thinking (2016). 14
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example to investment in water treatment solutions). Beyond water companies, significant PES 
investment by the private sector is likely to remain limited without further reform of relevant fiscal 
and regulatory frameworks to provide the necessary commercial incentives. 
Incentive payments to farmers in England have usually been based on individual contracts, 
whereas payments to communities or groups of farmers could help ensure that individual actions 
best complement the actions of others in production of ecosystem services at a necessary scale, 
for example, comprehensive water quality protection throughout a hydrological sub-catchment. 
Such environmental stewardship as a community rather than individual responsibility may also 
promote advantageous social learning, self-monitoring and regulation, and partnership working. In 
England a small number of multi-actor agreements have been in place , for example, to manage 15
overgrazing on moorland in South West England. Here farmers formed a limited company which 
receives funds for distribution to members and assumes responsibility to ensure members adhere 
to the environmental management requirements of the agreement. Such examples remain rare. 
They can incur considerable time and transaction costs to set up and may require additional 
incentives for farmers (premium payments or threat of regulatory control), as UK farmers do not 
generally have experience of such collaboration.     
6.4 Advice provision 
Since the mid-1980s production oriented farm management advice has been treated by 
successive governments as a private good to be provided by competitive commercial suppliers 
(Garforth et al., 2003). State funded farm advice originally focused on farm productivity but has 
increasingly adopted an environmental protection agenda. Public provision in England now takes 
the form of the Farming Advice Service (FAS) which is delivered by a network of contracted 
independent advisors. It provides advice on the BPS, cross-compliance and ‘greening 
requirements’, other environmental regulations, nutrient management and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation. Advice is delivered via on-line information, articles in the farming press, 
workshops, farm walks and drop-in-clinics (Gov.UK, 2016c). The CSF9 programme has primarily 
distributed grants for on-farm capital works that protect water resources but CSF advisors also 
provide farmers with pollution mitigation advice in 77 priority catchments. 
A range of private and civil society organisations also provide advice, and both FAS and CSF work 
in partnership with other voluntary initiatives such as the CFE5, and organisations such as the 
National Farmers Union, Country Land and Business Association, Agricultural Industries 
Confederation (AIC) and rivers and wildlife trusts. In England agricultural knowledge and 
information systems can thus be characterised as highly diverse and decentralised. There are at 
least 80 sources of advice to land managers (Defra, 2013a, p.4; Prager and Thompson, 2014, p.8) 
from “at least 14 different types of actor” (Curry et al., 2012, p.244). However, it is a subset of 
these led by CSF and rivers trusts that possesses most in-depth expertise related to DWPA. The 
AIC and its Fertiliser Advisers Certification & Training Scheme (FACTS) are also notable. This 
voluntary scheme sets standards, provides training and accredits advisers who provide nutrient 
management advice. Growth to over 2500 qualified advisers in the UK demonstrates demand by 
farmers for reliable advice to optimise crop nutrition whilst protecting soil, water, air and biodiversity 
(BASIS, 2016). 
6.5 Knowledge base 
For farm typologies in England there is a body of evidence for the effectiveness of DWPA 
mitigation measures at a field scale (Newell Price et al., 2011 ; Cuttle, et al., 2016). Although this 16
could be further improved (Randall, et al., 2015; Holden, et al., 2016), it is informing 
implementation of the national mitigation framework. Knowledge of catchment scale responses to 
mitigation measures is subject to greater uncertainty. On-going research through ‘demonstration 
 Formed under the Environmental Stewardship scheme prior to 2016.15
 An inventory of methods and user guide for selection of farm-level mitigation options to reduce DWPA, air 16
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.
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test catchments’ is addressing this (McGonigle, et al., 2014), and novel spatial environmental 
science and modelling approaches are being used to assess pollution risks, pressures and 
mitigation strategies at a catchment scale (Holden, et al., 2016). Guidance and case studies have 
also been compiled to assist development of PES-based schemes (e.g. Smith et al., 2013). 
6.6 Other policies 
WQT schemes and pollution taxes are not active policies for DWPA mitigation in England. With 
regard to perverse incentives, the BPS is ‘decoupled’ from production incentives though it can be 
argued that any farm income support is fungible and may still contribute to intensification. 
However, it has also been directly observed by the authors that financially marginal and under-
capitalised farms are often among the worst polluters; at least in the dairy sector. 
6.7 Evaluating the effectiveness of the mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from 
agriculture in England: synergies, conflicts, deficiencies and collective action 
The responsible authorities are deliberately parsimonious in enforcement of farm regulation, 
stemming from caution given the evidential costs of legal prosecution and a lack of political support 
for a ‘heavy-handed’ approach (key informants). In 2012, the National Audit Office concluded that 
the inspection regime by multiple agencies was lacking in coordination and burdensome for 
compliant farmers. Their evaluation was hindered by the lack of coordinated monitoring across 
inspections and outcomes, but it was concluded that the regime was not cost effective or ‘value for 
money’ (NAO, 2012). Table 2 summarises farm inspections relevant to Figure 2 and Section 6. 
Only a small proportion of farms are likely to receive such inspections  (NAO, 2012). It can be 17
concluded that the effectiveness of regulation to ensure the ‘reference level’ (Figure 2) for 
mitigation of DWPA can be improved.  
position -Table 2: Farm inspections in England relevant to mitigation of diffuse water 
pollution from agriculture, 2011-2012 
Source: Defra, 2013b 
Defra is seeking to improve data sharing and coordination of farm inspections between its 
agencies (Defra, 2013b). An ‘earned recognition approach’ (Table 2) also aims to reduce inspection 
burdens for compliant farmers recognised as ‘low risk businesses’ from their record of inspections 
and their participation in voluntary assurance schemes. Approximately 40% of farmers receive 
inspections to qualify for membership of non-government food standard and supply chain 
assurance schemes (NAO, 2012). Defra thus expects to improve targeting of its agencies’ 
inspections to those farms where the risks of non-compliance are highest. 
Evidence for the effectiveness of voluntary action by farmers to mitigate DWPA is lacking as NGOs 
(and government agencies) typically lack resources for evaluation studies (or prefer to prioritise 
expenditure on actions). However, the available evidence is largely positive. A leading example is 
provided by the Cornwall Rivers Project (CRP). Implemented by the Westcountry Rivers Trust 
(WRT) from 2002 to 2006 at a cost of £2.6 million this project provided ‘tailored’ advice to 870 
farms covering over 56,000 ha and 1,380km of watercourses. An independent economic survey 
reported average annual cost savings per farm from measures that mitigate DWPA of over £1360, 
achieving ‘payback’ for the project in less than 3 years (WRT, 2006). Further to this, in England 
268,500 ha of voluntary environmental land management (i.e. not incentivised by payments) were 
achieved in 2015 (Defra, 2015a); equivalent to approximately 8.5% of the area of cereals grown in 
the UK in the same year (Defra, 2015b). However, this had declined from 676,700 ha in 2013 
illustrating that although voluntary action can be achieved at scale its effectiveness may be limited 
by the fact that it is non-binding. 
For incentive payments schemes to be effective in mitigating DWPA they must make good use of 
their limited financial resources through targeting and sustained rates of scheme participation. 
Targeting requires that farmers undertake the correct actions in the correct locations for prevailing 
 Although for all purposes over 110,000 farm inspections are made annually (NAO, 2012).17
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water quality problems. Recent revisions to cross-compliance and the CS scheme (Section 6.3) go 
some way to address past criticisms that targeting for DWPA largely failed because of weak 
incentives for farmers to adopt those measures with the greatest potential to deliver soil and water 
protection outcomes, whilst regional priority statements10 inadequately prioritised water quality 
protection as compared to landscape heritage and biodiversity conservation (Defra and The Rivers 
Trust, 2012). In particular, farmers have rarely considered the payments for DWPA mitigation 
measures that require partial or full land retirement in specific locations to be sufficient to offset the 
income foregone, particularly as they were able to adopt lower opportunity cost measures that 
achieved other environmental objectives (with marginal if any benefit to water protection) to qualify 
for the CS scheme . It is thus important that options for mitigation of DWPA in the CS scheme are 18
adequately prescribed, prioritised, incentivised and locally varied. CSF capital grants have been 
focused on DWPA and competitive for farmers, but their optimal targeting has been hindered by 
data deficiencies, uncertainty regarding the nature and severity of water quality problems, and 
limits to the time that CSF advisors can spend visiting farms and co-planning optimal measures 
(Defra and The Rivers Trust, 2012).  
Sustaining farmer participation relates to incentives and the length of agreements. The CS scheme 
offers 5 year agreements for most measures, and 10 year agreements for some ‘Higher Tier’ 
measures. Both can be too short to ‘lock’ strategic environmental improvements into the 
landscape, but farmers are often reluctant to enter into longer agreements (Smith et al., 2012). UK 
and EU budget cycles that sustain funding also operate over 5 and 10 year cycles at most. 
England also lacks legal provision for agreements between a landowner and another party which 
place long-term restrictions on the use or management of a parcel of land (Law Commission, 2013; 
Smith, 2013). The Law Commission recommends introduction of conservation covenants to 
provide this instrument (Law Commission, 2014) but this has yet to be enacted (Law Commission, 
2016). 
As noted, privately funded PES schemes in England are few and mainly focus on protecting 
sources of drinking water. However, their existence and potential growth requires coordination with 
public schemes to optimise leverage of environmental benefits, avoid double-funding of measures 
and achieve spatial targeting. Similarly, coordination is needed with regulation, voluntary action 
programmes and other incentive schemes for habitats and climate change mitigation. Multiple 
agencies are involved, e.g.: Environment Agency, Natural England, local authorities, water 
companies, and NGOs; each with different priorities and working to different spatial boundaries. 
Also two government sponsored partnership programmes – the Catchment-Based Approach  and 19
Local Nature  partnerships - address different environmental objectives and scales of 20
management.  Coordination between all entities is needed for the mitigation framework for DWPA 
to be as effective as possible. For example, data sharing and joint mapping can be a first step in 
condition and threat assessment for water bodies, leading to better aligned plans for a multi-
functional landscape. Multi-stakeholder partnerships offer a means for local knowledge to inform 
CS scheme priorities but to date there has been little dialogue and synergy between these 
processes . Hence, the potential benefits of participation by stakeholders are not being fully 21
captured (despite the prescriptions of Article 14 of the EU WFD; information from key informants). 
Inter-agency coordination is also important in relation to advice provision. The diverse, 
decentralised and privately driven advice sector that has evolved in England has strengths and 
 Similarly, it is currently anticipated that under ‘greening rules’ qualifying EFAs can be established very 18
flexibly on farm holdings and hence are unlikely to be well targeted to protect water resources.
 Multi-stakeholder Catchment Partnerships for each of 83 catchments in England, tasked to generate an 19
understanding of the water quality issues in each catchment and involve local communities in decision-
making on solutions (Defra, 2013c).  
 Partnerships of local organisations, businesses and people that aim to improve their local natural 20
environment (Defra, 2012).
 However, some public consultation mechanisms were used to inform design of the CS scheme.21
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weaknesses (Sutherland et al., 2013). Pluralistic providers supply choice, flexibility, competition, 
reduced public cost and perhaps efficiency to a heterogeneous farming sector (Garforth et al., 
2003), and farmers who know what they want can access information from competent actors 
(Knierim and Prager, 2015). However, fragmentation, a lack of coordination and short term 
relationships between advisers and farmers may lead to inconsistent messages, duplication and 
gaps in provision, and consequently to confusion and message fatigue for farmers (AIC, 2013), 
and to loss of trust in the adviser from farmers (Sutherland, et al., 2013).  
7. The mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture in China and its 
effectiveness 
7.1 Regulation 
China lacks farm-level regulation and enforcement for mitigation of DWPA comparable to that in 
England. This is inevitable given the number and size of farms and the history of their role in 
economic development. However, the proportion of land farmed in larger units is rapidly increasing 
through land ‘transfer’  (Huang et al., 2012), and central government is strengthening higher level 22
regulations, monitoring and enforcement to address environmental degradation. For example, 
stricter penalties for enterprises polluting water resources and updated national water quality 
standards were introduced by the 2008 Water Pollution Law. The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and the Ministry of Water Resources have also enhanced their discharge and water 
quality monitoring, although their spatial coverage remains relatively sparse. However, ‘top-down’ 
regulatory intent is widely ‘decoupled’ from ability for implementation and enforcement (Marquis et 
al., 2011; Wang and Wang, 2011). For mitigation of DWPA this is caused by multiple multi-level 
factors (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Among these is a lack of sufficiently well-defined regulations for 
management of soils, animal wastes and fertilisers. Central government and provinces produce 
guidelines (e.g. ECEGP, 2015) but these remain advisory and non-enforceable. Regulation and 
oversight of quality control in the manufacture of chemical fertilizers is also lacking (Li et al., 2013). 
Similarly in most areas there is a lack of regulations for livestock waste treatment, storage and 
disposal, utilization of manures, carrying capacity of land and need for riparian buffer zones (Sun 
et al., 2012; Li et al., 2013). For the environmental laws that do exist enforcement is inconsistent 
across regions and penalties are usually insufficient to ensure compliance; hence reinforced by a 
continuing growth-first mentality the judicial system remains largely “incapable of providing robust 
protection of environmental rights against abuses” (Wang and Wang, 2011, p.169).  
7.2 Incentive payments 
A variety of ‘eco-compensation’ programmes exist, but lesson drawing from these is weak across 
regions and sectors (Bennett, 2009; Zhen and Zhang, 2011), let alone internationally. Most concern 
provision of watershed ecosystem services from land use change in upper catchments. 
Compensation payments in cash and/or grain are made to farmers who take land out of crop 
production, with the aims of reducing deforestation, soil erosion and rural poverty rather than 
DWPA per se. Nonetheless leading schemes provide relevant experience and some evidence of 
success; for example, the Sloping Land Conversion Programme (SLCP; Xu et al., 2004a) and 
Grain for Green Programme (GGP; Cao et al. 2009). More water focused is the Paddy Land-to-Dry 
Land (PLDL) programme that aims to protect water quality and quantity for the Miyun reservoir that 
serves Beijing, and under which farmers are paid to convert their fields from flooded rice to dryland 
cropping (most opting to grow maize), reducing water consumption, and fertilizer and sediment 
runoff (Zheng et al., 2013). Under the SLCP at least 60 million rural households committed over 7 
million ha of cropland to conversion (Xu at al, 2006) and outcomes in Yunnan Province for 
example, were relatively well accepted by all stakeholders in terms of environmental and 
distributive justice (He and Sikor, 2015). For the GGP total vegetation cover in areas covered by 
the project in northern Shaanxi Province increased from almost 30% in 1998 to 42% in 2005 (Cao 
et al, 2009). Under the PLDL households upstream of the reservoir converted all of their rice fields 
 Processes of consolidation of small and fragmented holdings through a range of rental and transfer 22
arrangements.
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with corresponding improvements in water quantity and quality and an aggregate benefit-cost ratio 
for the programme of 1.5 (Zheng et al., 2013).  
Other scheme outcomes are mixed. Land targeting has sometimes been poor, inappropriate 
afforestation has reduced soil moisture and the water table, and excessive shading from trees has 
hindered ground cover increasing the risk of soil erosion and affecting biodiversity (Cao et al, 2009; 
Xu at al, 2006). Programme cost effectiveness has been questioned: in some areas compensation 
payments may have been higher that necessary to incentivise farmers; in others benefits of 
change to farmers have been marginal and re-conversion to prior cropping was expected once 
compensation phased out (Xu et al., 2004b; Xu et al, 2006; Xiaoyun et al., 2006; Bennett, 2009; 
Zhen and Zhang, 2011). Farmers and other stakeholders have also not been involved sufficiently in 
scheme design and selection of plots for conversion, contributing to sub-optimal programme 
delivery (Xiaoyun et al., 2006). 
7.3 Advice provision, voluntary action and knowledge base 
The scope for voluntary action by farmers to mitigate DWPA in China is limited in many arable and 
horticultural systems by field and farm size, income levels, prevailing knowledge, attitudes and 
practices (in part age and gender related), and increasingly by labour constraints (Smith and 
Siciliano, 2015; Smith et al., 2015b). There is more scope in confined animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs) and emerging large farms, but most farm decision making remains driven by an ethos to 
maximise food production and economic growth (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). A culture of 
environmental stewardship by farmers or NGOs that could promote this barely exist. There is, 
however, great potential to improve the efficiency of farming practice whilst maintaining productivity 
and reducing risk to the environment. For example, management of soils, manures, chemical 
fertilizer and irrigation could all be improved to more closely match crop requirements and reduce 
risk of losses to air and water (e.g. Chen et al., 2014; Powlson et al., 2014). This emphasises AKIS 
and their ability to change farmer behaviour through advice, training and access to technologies. 
Dominated by the PAES to date, AKIS in China are currently in an uncertain transition towards the 
more diverse, liberalised and networked systems observable in most developed economies (Smith 
at al., 2015b). 
As it is large in terms of staffing and number of township ‘stations’, in the ‘absence’ of regulation 
and incentive schemes (Sections 7.1 and 7.2), the PAES is the leading public resource available 
for mitigation of DWPA. This presents both an obstacle and an opportunity. An obstacle if people, 
procedures and institutions are not oriented to address environmental protection and are resistant 
to change, but an opportunity in terms of the human and physical capacity that exists. Hence 
current attempts to mitigate DWPA in China must focus in large part on the capabilities of the 
PAES. However, many observers are critical of its status and performance. They note: low 
responsiveness to community and farmer needs despite strong demand for new technologies; 
insufficient attention to market access, information provision and information technology in remote 
areas; functional specialisation and ‘silo-working’ at Ministerial, provincial, municipal and county 
levels (even though at township level a single station usually implements all extension activities; 
Huan et al., 2010); fragmentation of stakeholders, each with varying roles, knowledge, objectives 
and policy instruments; and lack of coordination and scientific consensus between the PAES and 
universities and research institutes despite their growing role in technology development and 
transfer (Ma et al., 2013). The PAES exhibits an interventionist approach to agricultural 
modernisation based on integration of research, education and extension under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and a linear model of technology transfer (from scientists to the users) (Hu et al., 
2009).   
Through workshops with local stakeholders and key informant interviews in each of the four 
locations visited in China (Section 2), the PAES was observed to be capable of disseminating 
information but farmers were passive recipients of recommendations with little formalized 
opportunity to feedback priorities and needs. Farmers surveyed often reported greater trust in 
neighbours and relatives than in PAES technicians (Smith, et al., 2015b). Efficiency in use of 
natural resources and environmental protection remain low priorities in rural areas (Smith and 
Siciliano, 2015) and the PAES remains strongly focused on productivity, hindering development of 
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a coherent strategy to balance this with environmental protection. For DWPA, lacking relevant 
regulation and publicly available data for ground and surface water quality , there were no 23
‘reference levels’ against which to set advice and training, or evaluate achievement. Similarly, 
relevant research is fragmented, lacks coordination and is not being compiled in the form of an 
accessible knowledge base for use by the PAES and wider AKIS. At local level the education level 
of extension agents is relatively low, they lack well-adapted ‘messages’ for mitigation of DWPA and 
training in modern communication methods. Overall the functional divisions and failures of PAES 
performance indicate that current provision is poorly equipped to meet the needs for horizontal 
coordination of all AKIS actors (including innovation by and feedback from farmers), and for 
integrated assessment, design and implementation of measures for mitigation of DWPA. However, 
at village and township level functions and approaches are more integrated, and despite technical 
capacity limitations, there may be some scope for the emergence of a more holistic approach 
(Smith and Siciliano, 2015). There are thus many deficiencies in the knowledgebase base needed 
to support the mitigation of DWPA. Universities and research institutes need to be faced with 
applied questions and problems delivered from the farmers and other stakeholders in order to 
carry out and communicate the most relevant research (Rahn, 2013); yet incentives for 
researchers inevitably favour high impact journal publications over knowledge transfer to farmers, 
whilst the Ministry of Education in China lacks bureaucratic alignment  with the Ministries of 24
Environmental Protection and Agriculture. 
7.4 Other policies 
As in England, WQT and pollution taxes are not active policies in China, and scope for reduction of 
perverse incentives from agricultural support policies is limited. Such policies include direct 
payments for grain production, a general subsidy for agricultural inputs, a subsidy for adoption of 
improved crop varieties, a farm machinery purchase subsidy, minimum grain purchasing prices, 
temporary storage options and some environmental protection measures (Ni, 2013). Although in 
aggregate the level, number and scope of farm support policies has risen, the value of support per 
capita and farm household remains relatively low. There are regional differences but farmers 
typically gain 5-6% of their income from support policies, much less than in most developed 
economies (OECD, 2011; Ni, 2013). Although potentially fungible, most support can also be 
considered decoupled from production decisions (Chen, 2011; Ni, 2013; Huang, 2014). It may also 
modestly inhibit more rapid transition to larger farms that have more potential for regulation, advice 
provision and capacity for environmental protection measures (Smith and Siciliano, 2015); 
although the need to address rural poverty and manage rural-urban transitions must be 
recognised. 
In contrast to England where world market determined prices limit demand for fertilizer, the 
fertilizer sector in China merits reform. A policy of price caps was removed in 2009 but import tariff 
reductions are still used to mitigate domestic shortages and four subsidy programmes remain  (Li 25
et al., 2013). Together with the general farm input subsidy these industry subsidies provided USD 
18.76 billion to the sector in 2010 (Li et al., 2013). This contributes to inefficient manufacturing, 
variable quality and relatively low prices. For example, since the 1970s, farmers have paid 50 to 
75% less for urea fertilizer than the world market price (Li et al., 2013). This induces excessive and 
poorly managed use by farmers and thus to DWPA (Sun et al., 2012; Li et al., 2013). 
 For example, it was reported during a workshop in Huantai County that groundwater quality monitoring is 23
the responsibility of the Provincial Environment Department and that data is not accessible to the County 
Agricultural Bureau.
“…the extent to which the structure of the government allows national development strategies and policies 24
to be consistently and effectively implemented” (Marquis et al., 2011, p. 41).
 Exemption from electricity price increases for manufacturing plants; exemptions from price increases and 25
certain charges for rail transport costs; exemption from value added tax; and a credit subsidy for enterprises 
providing six months storage of fertilizer as a reserve to stabilize supply (Li et al., 2013).
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8. The potential for lesson drawing for mitigation of diffuse water pollution from agriculture 
in China 
No elements of the mitigation framework for DWPA present in England are completely absent from 
China and lesson drawing must consider what can be better developed rather than what could 
commence. Table 3 attempts a first high level assessment of the questions and indicators from 
Table 1 (this could be broken down into more detail for specific policy components).    
position - Table 3: Assessment of lesson drawing for mitigation of diffuse water pollution 
from agriculture in China 
With regard to regulation there is growing public demand for improvements in environmental 
quality in China (e.g. Economist, 2014), although the advocacy role of civil society is limited by the 
political restrictions placed on the activities of non-governmental actors. Central pronouncements 
signal the aim of ‘green development’ (protecting the environment and pursuing environmentally 
friendly economic growth; 13th Five Year Plan, 2016-2020), but China remains some way from 
regulating a ‘reference level’ of good practice in relation to DWPA in its diverse farming systems. 
This generic aim can be usefully drawn from Figure 2 and international examples, but the actual 
regulatory regime must be unique to Chinese conditions. Regulation of the farming sector is not yet 
highly politicised and any resistance may be low and lack organisation, but small farm scales and 
incomes may limit the compliance-related costs that can be imposed before many remaining 
smallholders are forced out of markets (FORHEAD, 2014).  
Other leading constraints to better farm regulation are institutional density, communication, data 
sharing and coordination gaps across agencies (including Ministries), the diversity of China’s 
physical geography and farming systems, available resources for monitoring and enforcement, and 
the sheer number of small farms. For example, regulations issued by central and provincial 
governments are monitored and enforced by local governments that tend to prioritise production 
and growth (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Varied and partly overlapping responsibilities for regulating 
soil and water quality are spread across the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of 
Land Resources, the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture (World Bank, 
2006; FORHEAD, 2014). Local conditions are often not well addressed by the poor functionality 
and lack of specificity of much environmental regulation (Wang and Wang, 2011); a lack of clarity in 
definition of rights and responsibilities leaving transposition to guidelines and enforcement at the 
discretion of local authorities (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Constraints to publication and sharing of 
data are barriers to improvement in agency cooperation (Smith and Siciliano, 2015). Meta-data, 
sampling methods, and other strengths and weaknesses of different data sets are rarely made 
accessible to non-expert users or even expert users in other agencies and Ministries; in fact 
experts are often simply unaware of the data available outside their own organisation (FORHEAD, 
2014). Public participation remains limited to a passive role of ‘information provider’ without 
effective influence on agency performance evaluation and decision making (Burns and Zhou, 
2010).  
Central policy has provided the impetus and framework for incentive payments schemes in China 
(Bennett, 2009), but the PLDL programme is indicative that demand for this approach may grow, at 
least among municipalities seeking to protect their water supply. Growing leisure activity and 
tourism, as provided for example by Lake Tai, also increasingly provide drivers and potential 
financial resources for protection of water quality. Resistance to schemes may be low but 
weaknesses in the design and implementation of past schemes need to be avoided. Wide 
application of something like the CS scheme in England may be constrained by a lack of 
ideological consensus. Key tenets of Figure 2 – e.g. the ‘polluter pays principle’, a ‘reference level’ 
for farming practice, and targeting of incentive payments – may not yet be shared and accepted by 
a majority of stakeholders in China. Schemes need to be well adapted to Chinese conditions, 
locally varied (Zheng et al., 2013), and innovative in institutional arrangements to overcome 
resource constraints and resolve regional administrative and property rights issues over cross-
boundary ecosystem service provision (Bennett, 2009). To be significant in mitigating DWPA at 
national scale, schemes may need to be developed for large areas and for large numbers of farms.   
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Table 3 suggests that there are fewer constraints to drawing lessons from international experience 
to improve the effectiveness of advice provision and voluntary action in mitigation of DWPA. The 
PAES is relatively well resourced and has a clear and hierarchical institutional structure. There is 
potential to reform its priorities, ethos and modes of working to promote environmental protection 
alongside productivity in farming. It also has the potential to coordinate and quality assure other 
actors’ activities within the increasing diverse AKIS developing in China. Workshops and key 
informant interviews revealed, however, that this will require significant reorientation and training 
for staff and managers at all levels. They also revealed that the trust held by farmers in the PAES 
needs improvement, and hence lessons can be learnt from adviser accreditation schemes such as 
the FACTS in the UK. In comparison to England, it is also notable that China lacks the NGOs that 
have played a key role in mediation between state and farmers and in advice provision for 
mitigation of DWPA. There is also scope for lesson drawing to inform efforts to improve the 
knowledgebase for mitigation of DWPA in China. In England, information resources in the form of 
manuals and databases, experience of public participation, the demonstration test catchment 
programme and catchment modelling methods all provide examples to inform efforts in China 
seeking to apply its growing research outputs in coherent support of environmental protection 
policy. 
9. Conclusions: a mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture for 
China 
Drawing on Figure 2, Table 3 and analysis above, a focus on three policy approaches to mitigate 
DWPA in China can be recommended. First is the need for targeted regulation of specific farm 
units. Laws are already in place to control DWPA but transposition of these into binding regulations 
at a provincial and local level is weak, whilst monitoring and enforcement is difficult to achieve 
given the vast number of farms and characteristics of DWPA. Although the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection is leading actions to improve the national monitoring system for ecology 
and environment by 2020, resources for monitoring and enforcement remain limited and some 
targeting is required. For example, experience in England and the wider EU suggests that, given 
their relatively small number yet high potential to cause significant pollution loads, intensive 
livestock units (e.g. pork and poultry production) can be effectively targeted with regulation. China 
already has regulations which apply to the livestock sector and it is suggested that steps are taken 
to ensure these regulations are well-focused on mitigation of DWPA and are adequately enforced.  
Effective enforcement should be possible given the relatively small number of large livestock 
rearing units when compared to the total number of farms in China as a whole. In contrast, given 
limitations for their enforcement, manure and chemical fertiliser management regulations for arable 
crops are best left as guidelines and addressed through a voluntary and advisory approach 
developed by the PAES and its AKIS partners. However, as land transfer continues at a pace 
appropriate to local conditions and an increasingly dualistic structure of farming develops there can 
be ambition to develop a reference level of enforceable regulation for all large commercial farms. 
Second, targeted incentive payment schemes can be used strategically to protect water resources 
from DWPA. Payments would be offered to farmers in designated locations, for example, 
vulnerable land adjacent to watercourses or in recharge zones of aquifers used for water supply. 
Payment would facilitate conversion of land out of intensive agricultural production to low intensity 
farming or other land use with lower risk of pollutant emissions. Although China has considerable 
experience there is scope for lesson drawing for the modalities of such schemes from England and 
other countries. For example, transfer of methods to ensure cost effectiveness such as spatial risk 
mapping and modelling to identify land within a river basin with the most potential to buffer water 
resources from DWPA. Such zones often occupy land that is marginal for food production (and 
increasingly for mechanisation given growing labour constraints in some farming systems). Hence 
impacts on food security may be acceptable, and payment rates relatively affordable if based on 
opportunity costs of production foregone (cognisant of rural income concerns or resettlement 
needs). For example, the SLCP only reduced grain supply by 2-3% in the upper reaches of the 
Yangtze and Yellow Rivers (Feng et al., 2005). International lesson drawing may also inform 
payment regimes that ensure long-term land use change and prevent reversion. For this, 
payments need to be sustained over a sufficient time frame to enable farmers to obtain alternative 
income streams or resettle in different zones (migrants will require transitional support for 
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successful resettlement). Objective and transparent approaches are needed to help reduce 
potential disputes between local governments over assessment methods and compensation rates.  
Third, a relatively well resourced PAES exists to help farmers maintain and increase agricultural 
productivity which can be re-oriented and re-skilled for environmental protection. There are weaker 
constraints to lesson drawing from abroad to inform this. The need is to rebalance the importance 
of productivity alongside the stewardship of farm inputs, natural resources and wider 
environmental protection. Farm advice should emphasize resource use efficiency, profit 
maximisation and environmental protection alongside the goal of high productivity. It should 
increasingly address farms as businesses, looking beyond yields to the objectives of the business 
and management of costs, labour use, crop residues and animal wastes, marketing and supply 
chains and environmental impacts. Advice and training modes should become more differentiated 
by farm size, management type and cropping system. Similarly, a greater diversity of 
communication and education methods should be employed, matched to the needs and access of 
different farmer types, and also targeting wider public awareness of environmental quality and food 
safety. The PAES is a key resource for delivery, but also for coordination and quality control of 
other AKIS actors. Farm advice needs to be coordinated and consistent with DWPA mitigation 
strategies for defined farm types, cropping systems and areas; even if that advice is delivered in 
future via multiple public and private sector pathways. The advice and continuing research needs 
to be tailored to farmers’ needs and informed by their participation and a two-way dialogue. Closer 
inter-agency working, with improved communication and data sharing at all levels, are required to 
develop the new ethos and overcome barriers to coordination created by functional divisions and 
specialisations. A major challenge is that this re-orientation is needed from the highest levels of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and across staff and managers in regional and local government. 
Support should be given to emerging farmer associations and cooperatives, whilst large agro-
enterprises should be well-regulated but also assisted and utilised as demonstrations of best 
practice. Amalgamation of farms through land transfer offers growing efficiencies of scope and 
scale for provision of advice and technology transfer (also for implementation of incentive 
payments schemes). In England experienced and innovative farmers are part of the AKIS and a 
resource to be used for environmental protection. Small farmers in China are experienced but 
often ageing and poorly educated. However, a cadre of skilled managers of larger agro-enterprises 
is growing rapidly and provides a potential resource for innovation, practice and demonstration in 
pursuit of environmental protection. To support and facilitate each of the three approaches 
identified here, investment is needed in applied research to build an accessible knowledgebase. 
Citing leading examples, this knowledgebase must span from methods for public participation, 
through design and costing of farm best management practices and design of institutional 
mechanisms for incentive payments, to estimation of modelling coefficients empirically derived for 
conditions in China. 
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Figure 1: Stages of lesson drawing. 
!  
Source: Benson, 2009. 
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Table 1: Constraints to lesson drawing  
Source: adapted from Benson 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000. 
Constraints Key questions Indicators
Demand side constraints:
Policy demand Is there demand for the policy or 
programme?
High/low demand
Policy resistance Is there potential resistance to lesson 
drawing and policy change?
High/low resistance
Context/jurisdiction constraints:
Path dependency Are past policies restrictive or 
enabling?
High/low path dependency
Existing structures Are existing structures restrictive or 
enabling?
High/low structural density
Political context Is politicisation apparent? High/low politicisation
Resources Are resources adequate to support 
transfer in the receiving context?
Inadequate/adequate 
resources
Ideological consensus Is there ideological consistency or 
divergence?
Divergence/consistency
Application constraints:
Programmatic uniqueness How unique is the policy? Unique/generic
Programmatic complexity How complex is the policy? High/low complexity
Institutional comparability Will new institutions be needed? Disabling/enabling institutional 
conditions
Scale of change What scale of change is anticipated? Large/small scale change
Programmatic modification Are policy/programme adjustments 
needed?
High/low programme 
adjustment needed for transfer
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Figure 2: A mitigation framework for diffuse water pollution from agriculture  
!  
Source: adapted from Baldock and Mitchell, 1995. 
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Table 2: Farm inspections in England relevant to mitigation of diffuse water pollution 
from agriculture, 2011-2012
Agency Purpose Number of 
inspections
Comment Potential for an 
‘earned recognition’ 
approach
Environment 
Agency
Environmental 
protection 
(catchment 
related)
700 decreasing as 
information is 
gained
moderate 
Environment 
Agency
Water resource 
protection
2000 risk-based moderate
Rural 
Payments 
Agency
Cross-
compliance 
inspection
1,700: 1% of the 
claimants at 
minimum 
20% - 25% 
selected by 
random, others 
by risk
moderate to good 
(referring participation in 
voluntary farm 
assurance schemes)
Rural 
Payments 
Agency
Environmental 
Stewardship 
scheme 
eligibility 
inspection
2,500: 5% of 
beneficiaries within 5 
years of agreement 
and 2.5% of those 
over 5 years at 
minimum
20% - 25% 
selected at 
random, others 
by risk
good where based on 
past performance in the 
scheme
Source: Defra, 2013b
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Table 3: Assessment of lesson drawing for mitigation of diffuse water pollution from 
agriculture in China 
Policy approaches
Constraints to lesson 
drawing 
Regulation Incentive payments Advice provision/ 
voluntary action
Policy demand Growing demand Low but protection of 
water for drinking 
supplies and leisure 
activity becoming a 
driver.
Lacks articulation from 
the top-down; weak 
from the bottom-up. 
Policy resistance Low Low Low to moderate
Path dependency Low Moderate Low to moderate 
Existing structures High structural density High structural density Low structural density
Political context Low politicisation Moderate politicisation Low politicisation
Resources Resources inadequate Inadequate beyond 
water supply zones
Resources adequate
Ideological consensus Moderate consistency Moderate consistency Consistent
Programmatic 
uniqueness
Generic purpose but 
unique in detail.
Unique programmes Generic purpose but 
unique in detail.
Programmatic complexity High High Moderate
Institutional comparability Disabling Disabling Disabling
Scales of change Potentially large in 
scale.
Moderate to large Small
Programmatic 
modification
Relatively low for 
generic purpose, but 
high for detail.
Relatively high Manageable and 
iterative.
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